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White Supremacy as an Existential Threat: A Response to Rita Floyd’s The Morality of Security: 





Rita Floyd’s The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization is an important and 
insightful book that delineates a theory of just securitization (modified from the jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello criteria in just war theory) involving three sets of principles governing the just initiation 
of securitization, just conduct of securitization, and just desecuritization. This book is a much-
needed addition to the security studies and just war literature.  
 
Here, I apply Floyd’s just securitization theory (JST) to the threat posed by white supremacy to 
African Americans.1 I argue that white supremacy meets Floyd’s definition of an objective 
existential threat, potentially justifying the resort to securitization by African Americans. As Floyd 
writes in Chapter 5:  
 
 
1By focusing on African Americans, I do not mean to imply that white supremacy could not pose 
an existential threat to other groups, such as Native Americans.  
 2 
… non-state actors are permitted to [securitize issues normally under the state’s 
jurisdiction], and thus effectively defy the state, when states fail to do their duty to 
protect against an objective existential threat … this allows non-state actors to 
securitize against those unjust regimes that pose objective existential threats to non-
state groups within states.2   
 
In Section 1, I argue that African Americans constitute a non-state group, before demonstrating in 
Section 2 that white supremacy poses an objective existential threat to this group, meeting the 
criterion of just cause in Floyd’s JST. In Section 3, I show that, given the failure of legal challenges 
and democratic processes to mitigate this threat, African Americans may be justified in resorting 
to extraordinary measures to combat the threat of white supremacy, including “whatever most 
reasonable persons would agree constitutes exceptional means and actions … non-state 
securitization can take the form of secession, civil disobedience, acts of sabotage and resistance”.3 
Applying Floyd’s JST to the threat of white supremacy demonstrates the value of her approach for 
thinking about securitization outside the traditional foci of security studies but, as I discuss in my 
conclusion, also reveals limitations in her theory, particularly in relation to the criterion of 
reasonable chance of success when applied to non-state groups resisting an unjust state.  
 
1. Do African Americans constitute a non-state group? 
 
2 Rita Floyd, The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 146-47. 
3 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 61-62. 
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Floyd does not offer a detailed definition of the kinds of non-state groups that could, in principle, 
engage in securitization. On page 61 she writes that, according to Copenhagen School, 
“sufficiently organized societal groupings united by a strong enough “‘we’ identity” … can revert 
to a course of conduct that can only be described as securitization.” The Copenhagen School 
included “nations, religion and racial groups”4 in “societal groupings.” However, in a footnote, 
Floyd notes that many security scholars now hold that “other - smaller - non-state securitizing 
actors than those who can cement a large enough we-feeling are now a possibility”,5 suggesting 
that a shared identity is not required in order for a non-state actor to engage in securitization. But 
it appears that Floyd agrees with the Copenhagen School that non-state groups need to be 
“sufficiently organized” to engage in securitization, although she does not define this term.   
 
In her book, Floyd discusses organized groups such as the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and 
Arizona Border Recon,6 but does not discuss large-scale religious or racial groups. While there are 
organized groups that fight for African American interests, such as the Black Lives Matter 
movement, I argue that we should consider African Americans to constitute a single non-state 
group for the purposes of evaluating the possibility of just securitization for two reasons. Firstly, 
since Floyd rejects representative authority as a criterion of just securitization,7 there need not be 
an organization representing all African Americans in order for just securitization to be possible. 
 
4 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 64n14. 
5 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 61-62n14. 
6 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 61-62. 
7 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 146. 
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Secondly, all African Americans share an involuntary racialized identity that renders them 
vulnerable (to different degrees) to an ongoing and pervasive threat to their lives, welfare, and 
basic security.8 An implication of this approach is that, if the conditions of JST are met in this case, 
individual African Americans could engage in securitizing actions.9 At least, Floyd’s theory does 
not rule this possibility out.  
 
2. Is white supremacy an existential threat to African Americans? 
In Floyd’s theory, just initiation of securitization requires a just cause: “an objective existential 
threat to a referent object, that is to say a danger that — with a sufficiently high probability — 
threatens the survival or the essential character/properties of either a political or social order, an 
ecosystem, a non-human species, or individuals”.10 Existential threats include “all those things that 
threaten basic human needs, which when met, enable humans to live minimally decent lives.”11 
Does white supremacy pose an existential threat to African Americans?  
 
The term “white supremacy” does not simply refer to individuals’ racist beliefs. Rather, as Charles 
Mills explains, white supremacy “is a political system, a particular power structure of formal or 
informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material 
 
8 The degree to which an individual person is made vulnerable to this threat is complicated by the 
intersection between race, class, and gender.  
9 If one rejects my argument here, one can simply apply my argument to smaller organized groups.  
10 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 19-20. 
11 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 76. 
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wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties.”12 The concept of white 
supremacy captures the interconnected set of practices (social, legal, political) that privilege white 
identity and structure the lives of African Americans in distinctive ways regardless of the 
intentions of those involved in implementing those practices. So defined, white supremacy is 
embedded within multiple formal and informal institutional and social structures that affect all 
aspects of life for African Americans, including (but not limited to) the education system, the 
criminal justice system, and the health care system.13  
 
How does white supremacy harm African Americans? Using the examples of the criminal justice 
system, the health care system, and the COVID-19 pandemic, I show how, applying Floyd’s threat 
categories, white supremacy is an agent intended threat (“where an aggressor is at the source of 
 
12 Quoted in Dwayne A. Tunstall, ‘Why violence can be viewed as a legitimate means of combating 
white supremacy for some African Americans”, Radical Philosophy Today, 5 (2005), pp. 159-173, 
p. 60. 
13 Andrew J. Pierce summarizes scope of harm caused by structural discrimination:  
… the fact that African-Americans have a rate of poverty nearly twice that of whites 
predisposes them to suffer from other kinds of harm: poorer schools … greater 
likelihood of being a victim of violent crime and greater likelihood of imprisonment 
… reduced access to commercial services (since banks, grocery stores, and so on 
prefer to locate in neighborhoods with greater disposable income), and etc. 
(‘Structural racism, institutional agency, and disrespect,’ Journal of Philosophical 
Research 39 (2014), pp. 23–42).  
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the threat intent on harming”14), an agent-caused threat (where “an actor’s behavior leads to a 
threat to someone else … without the actor intending to do harm”15), and exacerbates the harm of 
agent-lacking threats (“threats that occur irrespective of human agency”16) such as disease.   
 
In the criminal justice system, white supremacy is an agent-intended threat to African Americans 
because of the effects of the intentional actions of actors within that system (prosecutors, police 
officers, judges). This threat arises from the association of blackness with criminality created by 
the long-standing unjust securitization of black bodies by the state. This association is so deeply 
embedded in US society that “the more stereotypically Black a person’s physical features are 
perceived to be, the more that person is perceived as criminal”.17 As a result, African Americans 
are arrested, convicted, sentenced (and sentenced to harsher punishments18), and incarcerated at 
higher rates than white people who commit similar crimes.19 The association of blackness with 
criminality also manifests in the many cases of white people calling police on African Americans 
 
14 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 83.  
15 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 90. 
16 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 86.  
17 Rebecca C. Hetey and Jennifer L. Eberhardt, ‘Racial disparities in incarceration increase 
acceptance of punitive policies’, Psychological Science, 25:10 (2014), pp. 1949–1954, p. 1949. 
18 Swartzer, ‘Race’, p. 12. 
19 Steven Swartzer, ‘Race, ideology, and the communicative theory of punishment’, Philosophers’ 
Imprint, 19:53 (2019), pp. 1–22, p. 11. 
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who are engaged in normal, everyday activities.20 But, most egregiously, the unjust securitization 
of African Americans has led African Americans to be murdered both by their fellow citizens, 
such as occurred in the killings of Ahmaud Arbery21 and Trayvon Martin,22 and by the very 
institution that is supposed to protect them: the police force. The list of unarmed black men and 
women who have been killed by police continues to grow, despite decades of protest.23 Indeed, as 
 
20 Abigail Hauslohner, Maria Sacchetti, and Shayna Jacobs. 2020. ‘Incidents of calling police on 
black people lead states to consider new laws’, Washington Post (May 28 2020), available at: 
{https://www.inquirer.com/news/nation-world/states-legislation-racist-calls-new-york-new-
jersey-oregon-washington-20200528.html}, accessed August 15 2020.  
21 Sean Collins, ‘The killing of Ahmaud Arbery, an unarmed black jogger in Georgia, explained’, 
Vox (June 24 2020), available at: {https://www.vox.com/identities/2020/5/6/21249202/ahmaud-
arbery-jogger-killed-in-georgia-video-shooting-grand-jury}, accessed August 20 2020.  
22 Ta-Nehesi Coates, ‘Trayvon Martin and the irony of American justice’, The Atlantic (July 15 
2013), available at: {https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/trayvon-martin-and-
the-irony-of-american-justice/277782/}, accessed on August 21 2020.  
23 See Michael Marshall, ‘US police kill up to 6 times more black people than white people’, New 
Scientist (June 24 2020), available at: {https://www.newscientist.com/article/2246987-us-police-
kill-up-to-6-times-more-black-people-than-white-people/#ixzz6W8s5Nwd1}, accessed on 
August 24 2020; and John Swaine and Ciara McCarthy, ‘Young black men again faced highest 
rate of U.S. police killings in 2016’, The Guardian (January 8 2017), available at: 
{https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/08/the-counted-police-killings-2016-young-
black-men}, accessed on September 2 2020.  
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I write this article in August 2020, an unarmed black man was shot seven times in the back by a 
police officer in Kenosha, Wisconsin.24   
 
White supremacy is an agent-caused threat when it leads to indifference to and neglect of the 
welfare of African Americans. This is most evident in the health care system; there is compelling 
evidence that white supremacy contributes to worse disease and mortality rates for African 
Americans compared to white people.25 Such neglect may not be intentional, but it is clearly 
culpable: given the well-documented history of racial bias in the health care system, no one 
involved “can reasonably claim obliviousness”26 about this issue.  
 
 
24 Jaclyn Peiser, Mark Berman, Mark Guarino, Paulina Firozi, and Griff White, ‘After video shows 
Wisconsin police shooting a Black man multiple times, National Guard is called to Kenosha’, 
Washington Post (August 24 2020), available at:  
{https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/23/kenosha-police-shooting-video-
wisconsin/}, accessed August 27 2020.  
25 See, for example, Gilbert C. Gee and Chandra L. Ford, ‘Structural racism and health inequities: 
Old issues, new directions’, Du Bois Review, 8:1 (2011), pp. 115–132, and David R. Williams  
and Ronald Wyatt, ‘Racial bias in health care and health: Challenges and opportunities,’ JAMA, 
314:6 (2015), pp. 555-556. 
26 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 91. 
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Finally, white supremacy magnifies the harms caused by agent-lacking threats, as has become 
startlingly clear with the COVID-19 pandemic, which has disproportionately affected African 
American and other minority communities.27 
 
White supremacy thus meets the definition of an objective existential threat: it threatens African 
Americans’ “basic human needs, which when met, enable humans to live minimally decent lives”28 
and causes them “to be fundamentally disabled in the pursuit of one's vision of the good.”29 In the 
words of Tommy Curry, “White racism, Black poverty, and the systematic incarceration of African 
descended people in America have rendered the ability of Blacks to determine their own economic, 
social and cultural development virtually impossible.”30  
 
Thus, the state not only fails to protect African Americans from threat of white supremacy, but 
exacerbates this threat through practices in state institutions such as criminal justice system. As 
 
27Weller, Christian, ‘Systemic racism makes Covid-19 much more deadly for African-Americans,’ 
Forbes (June 18 2020), available at: 
{https://www.forbes.com/sites/christianweller/2020/06/18/systemic-racism-makes-covid-19-
much-more-deadly-for-african-americans/#10bc476b7feb}, accessed 28 August 2020. 
28 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 76. 
29 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 105. 
30 Tommy J. Curry, ‘Please don’t make me touch ‘em: Towards a critical race Fanonianism as a 
possible justification for violence against whiteness’, Radical Philosophy Today, 5 (2007), pp. 
133-158, p. 134. 
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Floyd writes, “when states fail to do their duty to protect against an objective existential threat … 
this allows non-state actors to securitize against those unjust regimes that pose objective existential 
threats to non-state groups within states.”31 This provides the basis for the just securitization of 
white supremacy by African Americans.  
 
3. Securitizing white supremacy 
The securitization of white supremacy meets the criterion of just cause in Floyd’s JST: there exists 
an existential threat to a just referent object. However, for the securitization of white supremacy 
to be just, the following criteria must also be satisfied: right intention (“the right intention of 
securitization is the just cause”), proportionality (“the expected good gained from securitization 
must be greater than the expected harm from securitization”), and reasonable chance of success 
(“the chances of achieving the just cause must be judged greater than those of alternatives to 
securitization”). Securitization must also be conducted justly; security measures must be 
“appropriate and should aim only to address the objective existential threat … must be judged 
effective …[and] must respect a limited number of relevant human rights in the execution of 
securitization.”32 
 
What would the securitization of white supremacy involve? According to Floyd, securitization by 
non-state actors involves “whatever most reasonable persons would agree constitutes exceptional 
means and actions … non-state securitization can take the form of secession, civil disobedience, 
 
31 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 146-47. 
32 All quotes from Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 20. 
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acts of sabotage and resistance.”33 Later she elaborates, “what most reasonable persons would 
agree constitutes exceptional means and actions, most notably perhaps, in terms of the amount of 
harm, risked/caused or intended, and/or the level of violence employed.”34 So, to ask whether 
African Americans can securitize the threat of white supremacy is to ask whether African 
Americans, as individuals or as part of an organized group like Black Lives Matter, may engage 
in acts of civil disobedience, sabotage, and even acts of violence. Can such securitization meet the 
other criteria of Floyd’s JST? 
 
3.1 Proportionality and reasonable chance of success35 
In her discussion of proportionality, Floyd focuses on the potential harms resulting from state 
securitizations,36 and so there is little to guide us when applying this criterion to non-state 
securitizations. However, it is plausible to think that non-state securitizations might cause less 
overall harm than state securitizations simply because non-state groups lack the resources that 
states possess. When a state securitizes an issue, it has the power to restrict the rights and freedoms 
of millions of people and to unleash police and military power on an enormous scale, all of which 
must be weighed against the potential good to be achieved by securitization. In contrast, the 
securitizing actions available to a non-state group defending against an existential threat include 
 
33 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 61-62. 
34 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 139.  
35 I won’t say much about right intention here, but there’s no reason to think that the securitization 
of white supremacy could not be conducted with just cause as the aim. 
36 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 128-35. 
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civil disobedience, sabotage, and (possibly) violence. The potential harm caused by these actions 
(such as destruction of property, harm to individuals, and community unrest), compared to the 
existential threat being defended against, means that the proportionality requirement can likely be 
met more easily than with state securitizations.  
 
Turning to the criterion of reasonable chance of success (which is also a criterion of just conduct 
of securitization37), Floyd states that “securitization’s prospect for succeeding in securing the 
referent object must be established comparatively against the alternatives to securitizing.”38 Could 
the threat of white supremacy be addressed through alternatives to securitization (“commonly 
accepted political means not generally considered harmful”39), such as democratic processes, legal 
challenges to racist laws, and appeals to the legislature? 
 
Unfortunately, we have good reason to doubt the effectiveness of these methods. The most 
egregious institutionalized forms of white supremacy — slavery and segregation — were ended 
not by “political means not generally considered harmful” but only after decades of conflict, civil 
disobedience, sabotage, and violent protest. That these tactics led to the passage of the 13th 
 
37 “The security measures must be judged effective in dealing with the threat.” (Floyd, The 
Morality of Security, p. 20). 
38 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 138. 
39 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 139. 
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Amendment and the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides reason to think that “the conversion of these 
discriminatory laws was caused, in part, by violence and subversion.”40 
 
In contrast, attempts to change laws that cause disparate harm to African Americans, such as drug 
sentencing laws, though the court system have failed.41 As Paul Butler points out, “historically, 
legislators and judges have remedied racist law, but they have also, on other occasions, established 
and reinforced it.”42 We also have reason to be skeptical of relying on democratic processes to 
mitigate the threat of white supremacy: the rise of voter suppression tactics (such as redistricting, 
voter ID laws, and felon disenfranchisement) have disproportionately affected African Americans 
and other minority groups.43  
 
Furthermore, white supremacy threatens African Americans’ basic needs not only through 
discriminatory laws and policies but through racist attitudes and practices that are deeply 
entrenched within state institutions and which cannot be easily addressed through legal or political 
changes. For example, attempts to change racist attitudes in policing through bias training and the 
use of body cameras have had no impact on the disproportionate use of police violence against 
 
40 Butler, ‘By any means necessary’, p. 726. 
41 Butler, ‘By any means necessary’, p. 728-37. 
42 Butler, ‘By any means necessary’, p. 725. 
43 Atiba R. Ellis, 2015, ‘Race, Class, and Structural Discrimination: On Vulnerability within the 
Political Process’, Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 28 (1): 33-60. 
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African Americans.44 Indeed, the problem has worsened: a recent report found that “[w]hite 
supremacist groups have infiltrated US law enforcement agencies in every region of the country 
over the last two decades”.45 Given the failure of political, legal, and reform approaches to 
addressing the threat of white supremacy, there might be “reasonable grounds for believing that 
securization meets the prospect of success criterion”.46   
 
But, even if securitization could meet this criterion, requiring a reasonable chance of success 
criterion in this case (and in other cases of non-state actors facing unjust regimes) is problematic. 
The problem is this: in the case of white supremacy, the aggressor’s capabilities far exceed those 
engaged in securitization. So, even if securitizing actions such as civil disobedience and violence 
helped end slavery and segregation, 47 the fact that today white supremacy still poses an existential 
 
44 Sam Levin, 2020. ‘‘It’s not about bad apples’: how US police reforms have failed to stop 
brutality and violence’, The Guardian (June 16 2020), available at: 
{https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/16/its-not-about-bad-apples-how-us-police-
reforms-have-failed-to-stop-brutality-and-violence}, accessed August 24 2020.  
45 Sam Levin, ‘White supremacists and militias have infiltrated police across US, report says’, The 
Guardian (August 27 2020), available at: {https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/aug/27/white-supremacists-militias-infiltrate-us-police-report}, accessed on August 
22 2020.  
46 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 138.  
47 Michelle Alexander argues that the explicit racism in the Constitution and Jim Crow laws prior 
to the 13th Amendment and the Civil Rights Act has morphed into less explicit forms of 
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threat to African Americans points to the failure of these tactics in creating lasting change. It is 
therefore more reasonable to assume that securitization tactics will be unsuccessful, particularly 
given the likelihood of violent state backlash. This means that, under Floyd’s JST, securitizing 
white supremacy is unjustified despite white supremacy posing an existential threat to African 
Americans. This puts African Americans in an impossible situation: fight white supremacy through 
“ordinary political means” (which is almost certain to fail) or do nothing. So, although Floyd writes 
that, “non-state actors are permitted to … effectively deny the state, when states fail to protect 
against an objective existential threat”,48 insisting on a reasonable chance of success criterion 
makes denying the state impossible for non-state groups with few resources. 
 
Floyd thus fails to recognize that there could be a moral justification for futile resistance. For 
example, during the 18th and 19th centuries there were several armed slave uprisings, all of which 
failed49 and none of which had a reasonable chance of success. Under Floyd’s JST, these uprisings 
were unjustified. Yet, they are regarded today as heroic acts of resistance. This suggests that 
resistance can have moral value that is independent from chance of success but that reflects the 
 
discrimination (for example, through the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans). 
(The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York, The New Press: 
2012). 
48 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 146-47.  
49 Butler, ‘By any means necessary’, p. 749.  
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moral significance of asserting the value of human dignity and freedom in the face of oppression.50 
As Derrick Bell argues, “the struggle for freedom is at the bottom, a manifestation of our humanity 
which survives and grows stronger through resistance to oppression.”51   
 
Does this mean that any tactics may be used, if they are a form of resistance to an existential threat 
posed by the state? No: while the reasonable chance of success criterion is problematic for the 
reasons just outlined, other criteria in Floyd’s theory of just conduct of securitization set moral 
limits on the securitizing actions that may be used. For example, securitizing actions must not 
cause a greater threat than they aim to prevent; they must only aim at the existential threat; and 
they must be the least harmful option of available securitizing measures.52 Additionally, 
securitizing actions must “respect a limited number of human rights in the execution of 
securitization.”53 When considering the possibility of armed resistance and other forms of violence 
 
50This problematizes the proportionality criterion in both the initiation and conduct of 
securitization. If securitization could be justified as an affirmation of human dignity with little 
chance of success, securitization would be disproportionate because the harm caused by 
securitization would not be counterbalanced by the good of mitigating the existential threat. One 
way of addressing this issue would be to incorporate the good of affirming dignity into the 
proportionality calculation. 
51 Derrick Bell, ‘The racism is permanent thesis: Courageous revelation or unconscious denial of 
racial genocide’, Capital University Law Review 22 (1992), pp. 571–87, p. 573. 
52 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 153-60.  
53 Floyd, The Morality of Security, p. 20. 
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in response to the threat of white supremacy, such violence would only be justified if “it serves 
some defensive purpose. Killing someone who negligently fails to prevent a threat can only be 
permissible if killing them is causally effective in preventing that threat.”54 Thus, violent attacks 
on those not responsible for the threat of white supremacy would likely be unjustified.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Applying Floyd’s theory of just securitization to the case of white supremacy illustrates the value 
of her approach in recognizing that non-state actors may engage in securitization. Her definition 
of an existential threat allows a broader understanding of how a group’s basic needs may be 
threatened in different ways. However, her theory relies on a too-narrow conception of the moral 
goods that resistance might serve, hindering the capability of non-state groups to resist powerful 
unjust states. Applying her theory to the case of white supremacy also raises questions about the 
desecuritization of white supremacy. For example, does the state bear “remedial responsibility” 
for the harms of white supremacy?55 What restorative acts would redress these harms? These 
questions illustrate the potential of her theory to expand our thinking about securitization and 





54 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 166.  
55 Floyd, The Morality of Security, pp. 189. 
